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, NEWS FROM INSIDE 
A substantial amount of information 
has been received from East Timor in 
the last few weeks. Much of it comes 
from Fretilin sources. Information has 
also been received from contacts in 
Indonesian-held areas, especially 
student groups, and from refugees 
recently arrived in Lisbon. This 
month's commentary draws upon this 
new material. 
Human Rights 
Fretilin sources describe many cases of 
human rights abuses. Most appear to 
have occurred in the areas of Ainaro 
and Lospalos, where Fretilin clashed 
frequently last year with Indonesian 
forces. The majority of those who 
suffered appear to have been punished 
for travelling beyond the immediate 
confines of their strategic villages. This 
would indicate that local Indonesian 
commanders remain anxious about 
security. One case, for example, 
concerned 'Vai Leve, 40 years old, 
from Lospalos, who was killed by being 
beaten for ten hours by elements of 
Batallion 745 at a place called Mai Vari 
for having been in his vegetable garden 
without a surat jalan' (travel pass). 
Elsewhere the report cites the case of 
'Florinda, 30 years old from Lospalos, 
who was killed from blows given by 
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members of Batallion 745 for having 
gone to his vegetable garden during a 
period of curfew. This took place on 
5 .1. 87., at a place called Pupuhu.' 
These examples are taken from a 
Fretilin document produced in Timor 
on June 20 1987. It is just one of many 
which have recently arrived from the 
territory. 
Military Documents 
Among the most interesting documents 
received recently are maps captured 
from Indonesian troops. These provide 
detailed analyses of the terrain and an 
account of Fretilin positions. Fretilin 
commanders have superimposed their 
own movements on these maps, and 
dispatched them to Lisbon. Like the 
maps and military manuals captured 
and sent out some two years ago, they 
provide us with invaluable information 
on the course of the war. 
The new maps cover the regions of 
Barike, Kiras, Vikeke and Ossu, and 
are on a scale of 1150,000. They show 
the sites of resettlement villages. In this 
respect they are particularly 
informative, because they reveal the 
extent to which local people have been 
uprooted in areas that were subjected 
to intense aerial bombardment in 
1978/79 and encirclement campaigns in 
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1981. They show how the area under 
cultivation has fallen in the war zones 
and how the population has been 
concentrated around the strategic 
villages. 
Fretilin has also dispatched detailed 
accounts of engagements with 
Indonesian troops in the last twelve 
months. If confirmed, these would 
show that Fretilin controls 
considerable areas of territory in the 
central-eastern and eastern regions, 
and that many of the Indonesian posts 
in all areas except the north-west and 
border regions are subject to regular 
attacks. 
It seems that the Indonesian military 
embarked on a new military campaign 
at the end of June. Its primary aim was 
to locate and capture Fretilin President 
Xanana Gusmao. At the beginning of 
July, troop reinforcements were landed 
at Baucau. This coincided with the 
arrival of the new military commander 
in East Timor, Colonel Soenato. The 
centre of the new operation appears to 
be the Lospalos area. 
Klalerek·Mutin 
Several of the documents describe 
conditions in resettlement villages 
during the period from 1978 to the 
present. Of particular interest is the 
description of Klalrerek-Mutin, a 
village established following the 
infamous Kraras massacre in 1983, 
when Indonesian troops shot many 
villagers after an alleged Fretilin 
ambush in the area . 
The document claims that 1,593 
people lived in Kraras/Klalrerek-Mutin 
in 1983, and that today there are just 
570, amongst whom are 276 orphans. 
Most of the original population were 
killed, according to the report , in the 
wake of the alleged am bush by Fretilin , 
but many reportedly also died of 
starvation in the following two years . 
Today the village is surrounded by 
two security fences . The first of these is 
set two hundred metres from the village 
centre and controlled by 12 guard 
posts. The second ring contains ten 1 
guard posts , set three hundred metres 
apart . All Timorese men in the village 
have to perform guard duty at night, 
together with Indonesian soldiers . A 
platoon of troops is also installed in the 
camp. If a Timorese fails to report 
contacts with Fretilin or attacks by 
Fretilin troops, he or she is reportedly 
executed. 
The same document provides details 
about the economic regime within the 
village . The whole population is 
involved in 'forced labour' : both men 
and women of all ages are mobilised 
daily to work on the rice-fields, most of 
which are owned by Indonesians or 
local officials . The technique used is 
extremely primitive: fields are 
trampled by human labour rather than 
by buffaloes, as used to be the case. 
The village population is also 
reportedly forced to build houses for 
the military, stand watch over rice-
fields, fetch water and wood and wash 
the clothes of officials and care for their 
buffaloes . Fish caught in local streams 
are donated free to the military. The 
document emphasises that such forced 
labour means that people have little 
time to work their gardens and 
cultivate food for themselves: the 
document estimates that no more than 
two or three days per week remain 
available to the people. 
Transmigrants 
It seems that large numbers of 
transmigrants are entering East Timor 
illegally from areas of Indonesia such as 
Atambua and Kupang in Indonesian 
Timor, Flores, Macassar, Ambon , 
Bali , and even Jakarta. A document 
from Dili claims that there are 
currently over 20,000 illegal 
transmigrants in East Timor - as 
opposed to the two thousand or so who 
have entered under formal 
transmigration programmes. The 
illegals visit their relatives serving in 
the military , and then do not return. 
School Protest 
On July 13, school pupils in Dili held a 
protest outside the governor's office 
and that of the Indonesian government 
party , Golkar. They were complaining 
of discrimination in favour of 
Indonesian students, and of high levels 
of unemployment in post-school years. 
The demonstration was not reported in 
the Indonesian press, but was relayed 
by UPI in Jakarta to Australia. Shortly 
after this protest a fire devastated a 
substantial section of the market in 
Dili. It particularly effected traders 
from Java and Sulawesi who have 
gradually taken over the 'middleman' 
role previously performed by Chinese 
in the years before the Indonesian 
occupation . 
Carrascalao 
On September 30, Mario Carrascalao 
was appointed to a second term as 
governor of East Timor by both the 
Indonesian government and the 
parliament of East Timor. At his 
swearing-in ceremony in Dili, 
Carrascalao was praised by Indonesian 
Home Affairs Minister Supardjo 
Rustam for his efforts to promote 
development, which - Supardjo 
added were 'internationally 
recognised' (UCA News). Carrascalao, 
who is reported to be popular, has been 
governor since 1982. His new term will 
expire in 1992.• 
Human 
Rights 
Update 
In October Amnesty International 
issued a list of 24 political prisoners, 
released under Indonesian remission 
procedures in August of this year. AI 
believes that all were convicted, in Dili 
District Court, of conspiracy to commit 
rebellion 'after trials which Amnesty 
International believes may not have 
met international standards for 
fairness'. Most had served almost all 
their sentence. 
According to AI, the releases mean 
that 136 people continued to be 
political detainees in Dili - of whom 
63 were held in Becora prison, 
including 11 women, and 73 in the 
Comarca prison. 62 detainees from the 
military or Hansip were also being held 
in the Comarca, according to AI. 
We understand that on October 5, 20 
more prisoners were released. 
Further details, of those detained 
and those recently released, may be 
obtained from Amnesty International, 
1 Easton Street, London WClX 8DJ, 
UK. 
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New Appeal 
from Xanana 
The latest documents arriving from 
East Timor, reports Jill Jolliffe, contain 
an appeal to the UN Secretary 
General, Mr Perez de Cuellar, from 
Xanana Gusmao , Fretilin's military 
Commander, on behalf of the 
Conselho Revolucionario da 
Resistencia N acional ( CRRN, 
Fretilin 's ruling body). 
The appeal reached Lisbon in 
September. Xanana requests the UN 
Secretary General to secure safe-
conduct passes for the Fretilin 
leadership so that they can travel to 
New York, if a UN mission to East 
Timor cannot be arranged. After talks, 
the delegation would return to East 
Timor. 
The text of Xanana's appeal is as 
follows. After praising the improved 
stand of the Portuguese government, 
Xanana says that the UN stand is 
worrying: 
Xanana's Appeal 
"In the name of the martyrised people 
of East Timor, I appeal to your 
Excellency the UN Secretary 
General . . . to revise the present stand 
of the UN, recognising that the people 
of East Timor are included in the spirit 
and letter of UN Resolution 17 /30 ... 
I appeal to Your Excellency and 
formulate anew . . . our invitation to 
come to Timor so that, at any place, 
and with the representatives of 
Portugal and Indonesia, a meeting can 
be held with the CRRN. If this is not 
possible, I solicit Your Excellency to 
use your good offices to guarantee the 
exit and return, in security, of a 
delegation of the CRRN for that 
purpose ... ' 
No response from the United 
Nations Secretariat had been made 
public when this issue went to press.• 
DIPLOMATIC 
VIEWS FROM LISBON 
Following the landslide victory in July 
of Professor Anibal Cavaco Silva's 
Social Democrat Party, uncertainty 
crept briefly into the government's 
policy-making over East Timor. There 
were press reports in Lisbon and 
internationally suggesting that Portugal 
had decided to drop the demand for 
'self-determination' for East Timor; 
and Indonesian newspapers, and some 
officials, made comments implying that 
a solution on Indonesian terms might 
quickly be achieved. In this issue we 
include two contributions from Lisbon, 
analysing the significance of the 
controversy and the position which is 
now likely to be taken by Cavaco Silva's 
government. Jean-Pierre Catry, of A 
Paz e Possivel em Timor-Leste provides 
the background. Jill Jolliffe argues 
that, in the end, there has been no 
change. Indeed, the new government is 
as firmly committed to diplomatic 
action on East Timor as its predecessor, 
as the new foreign minister made clear 
when he spoke at the UN General 
Assembly in August. 
PORTUGAL'S 
POSITION 
by Jean-Pierre Catry 
In recent months, all three of 
Portugal's sovereign institutions have 
adopted firmer positions in relation to 
East Timor. Since his election to the 
presidency in 1986, Mario Soares has 
solemnly and consistently defended the 
right of East Timor's people to self-
determination - as he did before the 
European Parliament in July of last 
year. The government of Cavaco Silva 
has likewise been more resolute, 
particularly since Portugal joined the 
EEC- refusing, for example, to take 
part in EEC meetings with ASEAN if 
these were held in Jakarta. The third 
sovereign political institution under 
Portugal's constitution, the 
Parliament, has also found a consensus 
on the issue. The all-party 
Parliamentary Commission on East 
Timor published a report on the 
question earlier this year and planned 
an international parliamentary 
conference on the issue (scheduled for 
June 1987 but adjourned in March at 
the government's request). Parliament 
unanimously condemned Indonesia for 
holding elections in East Timor, and 
Prime Minister Cavaco Silva 
denounced the same elections during a 
visit to Thailand in April, shortly 
before his government was dissolved 
ahead of the elections in July. In talks 
held in Lisbon with Mr Perez de 
Cuellar, UN Secretary General, Mr 
Cavaco Silva emphasised his 
government's determination to stand 
firm on the issue by describing the 
situation in East Timor as a 'military 
occupation'. 
The New Government 
It was the absence of any reference to 
'self-determination' and independence 
for East Timor in the new programme 
of government, published in August, 
which began the recent controversy. 
The programme spoke only of 
'guaranteeing total respect for the 
cultural and religious identity of 
Timor's people.' Questioned by the 
Socialist Party, the Prime Minister 
replied that 'this problem did not begin 
with this government (. . . ) The 
Deputy knows very well that the 
Government refused to accept that 
elections organised by Indonesia could 
be considered to be a referendum. But 
I ask you: what have we obtained until 
now?' Mr Cavaco Silva recalled that 
' the President of the Republic has 
particular responsibilities in relation to 
this question, the Government for its 
part has its own too, and it considers 
that this Chamber, in following up the 
work undertaken last year, must be 
associated in searching for a solution 
which, at least now, safeguards the 
national interest.' 
He went on to affirm that 'The 
Government will do nothing with 
regard to this matter which runs 
counter to the understanding of the 
other sovereign institutions. What it 
may do, in contrast, is to reveal the 
whole process in clear and unequivocal 
fashion, so that in the future it will not 
be accused of not having safeguarded 
the country's dignity.' 
A Shift of Position? 
Some observers detected in these 
statements a sign that the Portuguese 
government was surrendering its 
responsibility to defend the rights of 
East Timor's people. If the Geneva 
Embassy (responsible for Indonesian 
diplomacy at the UN Human Rights 
Commission) showed firm support for 
these rights, the passivity of Portugal's 
New York Embassy-which is directly 
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involved in the talks with Indonesia -
seemed to justify concern. 
In announcing that the Portuguese 
and Indonesian delegations had 
'considered the possibility of 
organising a visit to East Timor by a 
delegation from the Portuguese 
Parliament' during their discussions in 
New York , the UN Secretary-
General's 1987 Report further 
confirmed the fears of those who 
argued that the Portuguese 
government was retreating. Last year 
the government of Cavaco Silva 
sharply criticised a parliamentary 
delegation which, during a trip to the 
USSR, made plans to visit Estonia, a 
territory under Soviet military 
occupation: yet now it was proposing to 
permit a mission of the same sort to 
East Timor! 
Indonesian Propaganda 
In Indonesia the authorities barely 
concealed their satisfaction. The 
Indonesian press announced that 
Portugal had changed its position; the 
armed forces' newspaper (an 
influential organ given the power of the 
army in Indonesian political affairs) 
called for diplomatic relations to be re-
established; and Ali Alatas, 
Indonesia's principal negotiator, 
declared that his opposite number had 
initiated the proposal - adding that 
whether a trip took place would 
'depend on the nature of the visit, on 
what they want to see'. 'We won't 
change our basic stance,' he said. 'We 
will never ever welcome investigative 
visits' (Jakarta Post, 16.9.87). The 
same paper also claimed that the 
United Nations recognised East Timor 
as a Portuguese territory because of 
Portugal's Constitution and that 
Portugal ought to change its 
Constitution. 
This immodest vaunting by the 
Indonesians further embarressed the 
Portuguese government. How could 
the idea of a visit possibly be defended 
if Indonesia declared that the MPs 
would not be allowed to see what they 
wanted? 
It was thus the reaction in Indonesia, 
as much as or more than that of 
Portugal's opposition parties, which 
obliged the government to reaffirm its 
position. 
Government Fights Back? 
On September 23, speaking before the 
UN General Assembly, the new 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Joao de 
Deus Pinheiro, demanded not only 
'respect for the cultural and religious 
identity of Timor's people', but also 
that 'they should be guaranteed their 
freedom to define their collective 
destiny, observing the principle of self-
determination , as it has been defined 
by resolutions 1514 and 1541 of the 
General Assembly of the United 
Nations.' 
The following day, as he left a 
meeting with the President , Cavaco 
Silva declared that no direct 
negotiations were taking place with 
Indonesia outside the UN process. He 
reaffirmed that the right of self-
determination remains untouchable 
but deplored 'a certain hypocrisy in the 
international scene such that human 
rights violations in Afghanistan and 
Kampuchea are spoken about while 
violations of human rights that 
continue in East Timor are forgotten .' 
Portugal's diplomatic hesitations 
may largely be due to the lack of 
support - or to pressure - from 
abroad.• 
THE CAVACO SILVA 
GOVERNMENT 
by Jill Jolliffe 
In his first term as Prime Minister of a 
minority government (from October 
1985 to July 1987), Prof. Cavaco Silva 
was dependent on Socialist party 
support. During this term, his 
government took an overtly strong 
stand in support of East Timor's right 
to self-determination, matching the 
similarly forthright stance of President 
Mario Soares. 
In view of the row over the absence 
of the word 'self-determination' in the 
current government's programme, it 
should be noted that the government's 
programme did not mention 'self-
determination' during its first term 
either. Nor was this unusual: since 
Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975, 
few Portuguese governments have 
included this commitment in their 
programmes. 
Under Cavaco Silva the Social 
Democrats affirmed very clearly that 
they would not recognise Indonesian 
sovereignty in East Timor and would 
continue to seek a principled 
international settlement, in their 
recognised UN role as 'administering 
power' in East Timor. 
Indeed, Cavaco Silva took the 
strongest position of any Prime 
Minister in recent times, when he 
threatened to impose economic 
sanctions against Indonesia by 
exercising Portugal 's EEC right of veto 
against ASEAN-EEC trade relations. 
(Portugal joined the EEC in January 
1986.) 
Negotiations 
At the same time, the talks being 
conducted between Portugal and 
Indonesia under the auspices of the UN 
Secretary General have imposed a 
political focus on policy-making. 
Held behind closed doors, these 
talks have influenced public 
perceptions of the Portuguese 
government's position. This is because 
Timorese representatives have not 
been involved. (For discussion of the 
talks, see Timor Link 4, 6, 9.) 
The East Timorese independence 
movement (which now includes the 
conservative UDT party as well as 
Fretilin, the majority movement that 
commands military resistance within 
the territory) has naturally contested 
negotiations held under these 
conditions. 
Although officials now follow the 
practice of consulting Timorese 
opinion (as they did not do initially), 
this is not enough to satisfy criticism: 
the Timorese still fear , very 
reasonably, that Portugal might seek 
an easy way out through an accord of 
convenience with Indonesia, and they 
want full participation in the talks. 
There will continue to be nervousness 
about Portugal's political intentions 
while those who are most directly 
concerned are so obviously excluded. 
Influences 
Several other factors influence the 
stand which has been taken by Cavaco 
Silva and the governments he has led. 
The first is the cross-party consensus 
within the Parliamentary Commission 
on East Timor (see Timor Link 9, 10). 
All major Portuguese parties, from 
Communist to Christian Democrat, 
have agreed that self-determination 
and the involvement of East Timorese 
representatives in a solution must be 
fundamental to Portuguese policy. 
Portuguese policy. 
A second factor, which should not be 
underestimated, is the personality of 
Cavaco Silva himself. A man of action 
rather than words, he was responsible 
for introducing the prospect of an EEC 
veto, speaking to journalists from 
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ASEAN countries while he was in 
Bangkok (see Timor Link . 10). 
Through all the recent fuss, there 1~ no 
evidence to show that Cavaco Silva 
himself has ever wavered in his own 
position. 
Finally, there is the example of the 
1979-80 Social Democrat government 
of Francisco Sa Carneiro, who was 
killed in a plane crash in December 
1980. From the right of Portuguese 
politics, Sa Carneiro took a far more 
assertive role on East Timor than 
previous Prime Ministers had done. In 
particular, his strong stand contrasted 
with the Socialists' inclination to 
accommodate Indonesia. The current 
government takes the Sa Carneiro 
government as its model. 
No Change 
During the period of equivocation that 
followed the election victory a 
government spokesperson said that 
Portugal had not changed its basic 
stand, but was attempting to show 
'more flexibility' in its negotiations 
with Indonesia by refraining from the 
word 'self-determination' in order to 
move negotiations on. This may well be 
right. The negotiations in New York 
have made little substantive progress 
recently, as the Secretary-General 
noted in his recent report. This is 
principally because Indonesia 
considers the sovereignty question as 
non-negotiable. 
The enthusiastic Indonesian press 
claims that Portugal was altering its 
stance cannot be taken very seriously. 
Much was made of the visit to East 
Timor by the right-wing Portuguese 
newspaper editor Nuno Rocha, of 0 
Tempo, who came back championing 
the Indonesian cause, but the 
Portuguese government dissociated 
itself immediately from Rocha's 
position. 
Most of the speculation about a 
Portuguese parliamentary visit to East 
Timor was equally without foundation. 
For one thing, the Portuguese 
parliament has had no opportunity to 
discuss such a proposal. Cavaco Silva 
made the government's position clear 
on September 27, when he stated that 
Portugal would consider sending such a 
mission only if Indonesia guaranteed it 
full freedom of movement to go 
wherever it wanted and see whomever 
it liked. He cricised past visits, saying 
they were highly controlled and 
restricted. 
Portugal Still Finn 
Doubts about Portuguese policy were 
finally laid to rest on September 23, 
when Foreign Minister Joao de Deus 
Pinheiro addressed the UN General 
Assembly. He led his speech with the 
Timor issue (the first Portuguese 
minister to do so) and said that the 
Timorese right to self-determination 
was a 'fundamental and 
unquestionable' tenet of Portuguese 
policy. 
The next day his speech was followed 
up by Cavaco Silva in a television 
interview in Lisbon, where he drove 
home the point and repeated 
Portugal's interest in raising the issue 
within the EEC. He said certain 
western countries were guilty of 
hypocrisy on East Timor and had 'been 
a little forgetful of their human rights 
commitments'. 
The situation therefore seems to be 
that, if Portugal did waver momentarily 
(leaving aside misrepresentations of its 
policy), it has now reinforced its 
position. Set for a full term of four 
years, the government is intent on 
effective action. 
This said, its performance should still 
be observed carefully. The Social 
Democrat majority is so large - they 
hold 148 seats in the 350-seat 
legislature - that there is a risk of 
complacency. In particular, a 
constitutional reform will come before 
the current parliament which will 
determine whether or not the 'East 
Timor Clause' in the current 
Constitution will remain intact. The 
relevant section reads: 
'l. Portugal continues to accept its 
responsibilities in harmony with 
international law, to promote and 
guarantee the independence of East 
Timor. 
'2. The President and the Government 
are vested with the power to take all 
actions necessary to realise [these] 
objectives . . . ' 
The thinking of the current 
parliament will be influenced by a large 
group of young Social Democrats 
whose position on East Timor is 
unknown. 
Overall the government seems 
determined to seek results in the East 
Timor case, and can be expected to 
mount a more energetic diplomatic 
lobby on the issue than its 
predecessors. It should be 
congratulated on its stand 
Portuguese governments are 
constantly criticised over Timor, but 
rarely praised when they do the right 
thing. NGOs and church groups have 
been offered a new challenge - to 
collaborate with and strengthen 
Portugal's more forceful diplomacy, 
which will begin by looking out for 
allies within the EEC.• 
Note: If readers would like to write to the 
Portuguese government about its stand, letters 
should be addressed to: His Excellency Prof. 
Anibal Cavaco Silva, Primeiro Ministro, Palacio 
de Sao Bento, Lisbon, Portugal. 
At the UN 
On August 13 in New York, the 
Decolonisation Committee held its 
annual hearings on East Timor. 
Petitions were received from many 
quarters. From the Portuguese 
parliament Sr Raul Brito emphasised 
that the issues of sovereignty and self-
determination remain central to the 
dispute between Portugal and 
Indonesia. He affirmed that 'The 
I Portuguese people will never accept 
any solution that is not the result of a 
genuine, free and properly supervised 
act of choice by the people of East 
Timor.' 
Two of the most prominent human 
rights organisations spoke, as they did 
last year: The American Asia Watch 
committee focused on the letter signed 
by no less than 40 US Senators to 
Secretary of State George Shultz 
expressing concern about the situation 
in East Timor; while Amnesty 
International demonstrated its 
consistent concern about the situation 
in the territory by reporting violations 
of human rights during 1986 and 1987 
that have been brought to its attention. 
The presence of the Roman Catholic 
Bishop of the Portuguese diocese of 
Setubal was particularly significant, 
because it was the first time that a 
Portuguese Bishop has testified 
formally before the Decolonisation 
Committee. His appearance, along 
with that of Sr Brito, provided further 
evidence that East Timor is being 
treated with new seriousness in Lisbon. 
Also speaking on behalf of 
Christians in Europe, CIIR presented a 
shortened version of the Christian 
Reflection on East Timar which it 
published earlier. this year in 
association with the Justice & Peace 
Commissions of Flanders and the 
Netherlands, and Pax Christi in 
Geneva. The Reflection has attracted 
support from Christian organisations in 
all five continents, and has been 
published in English, Portuguese, 
French, and German. 
Fretilin's external delegation was 
represented by Abilio Araujo, who 
presented extracts from reports 
received from East Timor in recent 
months. These described conditions in 
three villages, including Klarerek 
Mutin where the population is said to 
have fallen by two thirds in four years 
(see News from Inside). 
A number of other groups made 
contributions. Representing the 
London-based Indonesia human rights 
campaign, Tapol, Jonathan Head 
focused upon the World Bank's 
support for the Indonesian 
government's birth control campaign 
in East Timor, which, he argued, 
violated UN policy not to recognise 
Indonesia's integration of the territory. 
Sister Mary Philip, SSJ, of the 
Hobart East Timor Committee, 
testified on behalf of many Australian 
organisations. Michel Robert, of the 
Association de Solidarite avec Timor 
Oriental, described how, after the 
recent closure of the prison camp on 
Atauro island, many prisoners had 
been deported to strategic villages near 
the border with West (Indonesian) 
Timor. 
One of the most moving submissions 
was given by Mr Iwamura Shouhachi, a 
platoon commander in the Japanese 
army when it occupied East Timor 
during the Pacific (Second World) 
War. Recalling that period, Shouhachi 
stated, 'Isn't this exactly what the 
Suharto government is doing today in 
relation to the aggression against East 
Tim or?' 
The Decolonisation Committee has 
reported to the General Assembly, 
which, having received further reports 
- such as that from the Secretary-
General -, decided to adjourn debate 
on East Timor for a further year. • 
UN HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMMISSION 
Along with other international NGOs, composed of governments. Success this 
the International Service for Human year was important, because it reversed 
Rights, Geneva, lobbied hard to secure an earlier decision to remove East 
the adoption on September 2 of a Timor from the list of territories 
resolution on East Timor by the UN examined by the Commission (see East 
Human Rights Sub-Commission. The Timar Link 2, June 1985). The 
resolution (reference E/CN.4/Sub.2/ Commission will meet again m 
1987/L.11/Add.2) was adopted by 6 February-March 1988. 
votes to 4 with 9 abstentions. In the preamble, the Resolution 
The Sub-Commission is a committee of , states that the Sub-Commission is 'pre-
experts which reports to the 1 occupied by new allegations put 
Commission on Human Rights, itself forward regarding the violations of 
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human rights to which the people of 
East Timor continue to be subjected 
because of the situation which persists 
in the territory' and welcomes the co-
operation shown by the authorities in 
facilitating family reunions . 
The Text 
The body of the Resolution declares 
that the Sub-Commission on 
prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities: 
1 . 'Welcomes the action taken by the 
Secretary-general regarding the 
question of East Timor; 
2. 'Requests the Secretary-General to 
continue to encourage all parties 
concerned, that is the Administering 
Power, the Indonesian Government 
l;lii'i*' 
and the East Timorese 
representatives, to co-operate in 
order to achieve a durable solution 
taking into full consideration the 
rights and wishes of the people of 
East Timor; 
3. 'Requests the Indonesian authorities 
to facilitate without restrictions the 
activ1t1es of humanitarian 
organisations in East Timor; 
4. 'Recommends therefore to the 
Commission on Human Rights to 
study carefully at its forty-fourth 
session the evolution of the situation 
of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in East Timor.' • 
For further information write to the 
ISHR, PO Box 16, 1211Geneva20 cic, 
Switzerland (tel: 022-33.31.40). 
UNITING CHURCH AND 
EASTTIMOR 
by Robert Archer 
In June, the Uniting Church in 
Australia published a report, prepared 
by its Social Responsibility and Justice 
Committee, titled The Uniting Church 
and East Timor. 
This is an important statement, 
because it presents the view of a major 
church in Australia, and because it 
continues an evolving debate within the 
protestant churches about the question 
of East Timor. We reported in Timor 
Link's last issue, for example, the 
carefully-worded statement that the 
National Council of Churches of the 
United States (NCC-USA) published 
earlier this year. Very significantly, this 
debate is also being carried on privately 
with Protestant partner churches in 
Indonesia. 
It is also, however, virtually the first 
official statement issued by a major 
Protestant church that addresses the 
issues frankly and without 
circumlocution. In taking matters 
forward, as it has done here by 
publically identifying the problems, the 
Uniting Church in Australia may have 
facilitated the wider attempt being 
made by Protestant churches to respond 
adequately to a fundamental moral 
issue. It has taken courage to write this 
report and it should be widely read. 
The Four Violations 
The opening sections set out the factual 
background, and assess the differing 
accounts given by Indonesian and non-
Indonesian sources. The report 
concludes with this summary: 
'The present situation in East Timor 
is marked by gross violations of the 
rights of the people of that place. There 
are at least four areas in which the 
rights of the East Timorese people are 
beihg denied: 
i) 'Reports from many significant 
sources indicate that people have 
been killed and tortured in very 
large numbers. 
ii) 'Freedom of speech and assembly 
are heavily curtailed, press 
censorship is part of daily life and 
the right to organise is very 
restricted. 
iii) 'Culturally, ethnically and 
religiously, the East Timorese are 
looked down upon as a 'backward 
people' and treated in a manner 
that is perceived as racist. The 
actions of the Indonesian 
Government suggest that the 
intention is to destroy the East 
Timorese people spiritually and 
culturally. The de-Timorisation 
of East Timor is institutionalised 
- eg through schooling and the 
use of Indonesian as the official 
language. The re-shaping of 
Timor socially and economically 
has a real impact on the people. 
Timorese women are forced into 
family planning programmes. 
Widows and girls are forced into 
prostitution and servitude to save 
their lives'( . .. ) 
'The values and beliefs of the 
people, which they cherish and 
which give them their identity, 
are deliberately violated by the 
occupying power. Indonesian 
military presence is a constant 
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source of insecurity. The 
Indonesian presence does not 
protect the people, rather it instils 
fear and subservience. 
'Now the East Timorese fear 
they will become a minority in 
their own land. Under 
Indonesia's transmigration 
programme, East Timor has been 
designated an underpopulated 
region and a small number of 
people have already been settled 
there. There are plans to settle a 
larger number of transmigrants in 
East Timor by the year 2000 . . . 
The Timorese are being 
increasingly marginalised in the 
bureaucracy and the economy, as 
military personnel and Javanese 
steadily occupy the senior 
positions and sectors. 
iv) 'The government of Indonesia 
claims that the people have 
already exercised their right to 
self-determination. Yet the fact 
that fighting still continues would 
indicate that no such act has 
occurred. When asked in an 
interview in August 1985 to 
comment on the huge sums 
Jakarta is pumping into East 
Timor, Mgr Belo (the Apostolic 
Administrator of Dili) replied, 
'The only problem in Timor is the 
problem of the freedom of the 
inhabitants.' ( ... ) 
Human Rights and Self· 
detennination 
This section of the report goes on to 
conclude that 'The issue of human 
rights is not easily separable from the 
issue of self-determination' and that 'It 
is highly unlikely that the Indonesian 
Government will, of its own accord, 
allow a semi-independent government 
to exist in East Timor.' 
Further on, the report takes this 
argument further, stating that 'the 
abuse of human rights will continue 
while ever the government of 
Indonesia refuses to recognise the need 
of the people to have a more adequate 
say in their future . The situation in East 
Timor will not be solved militarily. 
Only a political solution will achieve a 
long-term settlement of the area's 
problems.' 
The statement strongly criticises the 
Australian government, for 
recognising the annexation and failing 
to uphold its international 
commitments, and quotes the 
Australian Prime Minister Bob 
Hawke, who regretted the absence of 
any act of self-determination but added 
'That was in the past ... we must now 
look to the future'. This, the report 
says, 'is both false and based upon a 
dreadful denial of Australia's 
commitment to the UN.' 
The PGI 
The report is most original and 
significant, however, when it examines 
the role of the Indonesian Protestant 
Communion of Churches (formerly the 
DGI, now the PGI), and the moral 
responsibilities of the Christian 
churches worldwide. 
'In public statements the 
Communion of Churches in Indonesia 
(formerly DGI, now PGI) has 
consistently placed itself with the 
Indonesian government in its invasion 
of East Tim or. While it has quite rightly 
and publicly criticised Portugal for 
failing to prepare East Timor for 
decolonisation, and has claimed that 
Portugal has abdicated all historical 
and moral right to authority in East 
Timor, yet it has supported the 
Indonesian invasion. ( ... ) 
'The PGI (then DGI) made the first, 
official non-Government visit to East 
Timor in 1977 to visit the 4,000 
Protestants there. Since 1980 it has run 
an ecumenical aid programme, and as 
part of that made a second visit in 1982. 
It has been actively involved in 
sponsoring and supporting Protestant 
clergy in East Timor. 
'A number of security officers and 
government officials are active in the 
Protestant community in Dili, creating 
a close link between the government 
and the church and helping to explain 
the church's stand on East Timor. 
There is also the factor of being a 
minority community in a country in 
which Islam is the major religion. 
'One of the reasons why Christians 
have a relatively important place in 
Indonesian leadership is that they were 
very actively involved in the 
Indonesian struggle for independence. 
There is within the Indonesian 
Christian community a tradition of 
commitment to freedom and human 
rights. One would have hoped that this 
tradition would have been more fully 
drawn on in this situation.' 
Some Theological Concerns 
'The church is always involved in a 
struggle to understand its Christian 
identity within the wider national 
identity and life. The struggle is always 
to maintain that identity without either 
being co-opted or domesticated, or 
being seen as disloyal to the goals of the 
wider society. 
'This struggle for identity is sharpest 
in those countries where the gospel 
seems most at odds with the values of 
society. (. . . ) 
'As a religious minority in a 
militarised country, the Indonesian 
Churches must struggle with how they 
maintain their identity, an identity 
which is tied to the liberating and 
saving acts of Jesus Christ. In the 
present situation of denial of human 
rights in East Timor and other places in 
Indonesia, the Church is provided with 
a very sharp reminder of its vocation. 
'There is a constant struggle in the 
Bible to remind people that God 
cannot be domesticated and used to 
support or give divine blessing to the 
present situation. God is always free, 
will not reveal God's name (Exodus 
3:14), prefers to live in a tent rather 
than a house (ie is a journeying God, 
not one who is at the disposal of a 
temple hierarchy-2 Samuel 7), and is 
always able to do the unexpected, call 
forth a new community, raise up a 
prophetic voice, and care for the 
oppressed. God is the One who chose 
the very unexpected way of the cross. 
'Jesus reminded the faith community 
that there are limits to the power of the 
State (Luke 20:19-26). A State which 
claims absolute power, and tries to 
justify all unjustness on the basis of its 
power, is reminded that God alone is 
Lord and total obedience is owed only 
to God. 
'Where our churches draw the line 
between obedience to God and 
obedience to the State, and when it 
becomes necessary to tell the 
Government that it encroaches on the 
realm of God, is something with which 
we must all struggle. Certainly in 
Australia we have not always done this 
very well, alternating between 
belligerence and silence. Part of the 
ecumenical dialogue is the ability to call 
each other to account for the way we do 
this, yet without the arrogance that 
suggests that an outsider can tell 
another how their church must be the 
church. 
'Yet, one of the issues which is 
highlighted in our attempt to relate to 
the issues in East Timor, is the question 
of who is the church to which we relate 
ecumenically. Is it simply the official 
(Protestant) council of churches? What 
becomes of the wider relationship with 
the Catholic Church, particularly as it is 
that church which most closely 
identifies with the people of East 
Timor? What happens when the 
position of these two bodies is 
apparently in conflict? 
'There is also the issue of de facto 
recognition of East Timor's annexation 
by Indonesia. The Uniting Church in 
Australia faces the same dilemma as 
the Catholic Church: how to arrange 
our life and relationships so as not to 
destroy our relationships with 
Indonesia (both Church and State), yet 
neither to alienate ourselves from the 
people who struggle in East Timor. 
Ecumenically this is very difficult, for it 
raises questions of our recognition of 
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the PGI's ability to speak on issues of 
East Timor.' 
New Relationships? 
In its concluding remarks, the 
statement questions whether 'the 
position of making no statements or 
applying no pressure unless requested 
to do so' by the local church is the right 
one. 
'The Churches in Australia 
(including the UCA, through the 
Australian Council of Churches) have 
adopted this approach in relation to 
East Tim or, relying on advice from the 
PGI. 
'Yet, if the Australian Church's 
position is that it will act in response to 
the people of an area, then questions 
must be raised about the adequacy of 
this approach. It may be time that the 
UCA turned for advice to that church 
which is most closely aligned to the 
people of East Timor, viz: the Catholic 
Church ... 
'Since 1983 the Catholic Church has 
spoken out strongly on the abuses of 
human rights in East Timor and the 
issue of the people's struggle for self-
determination. Various National 
Catholic Bishops' Conferences (eg 
Indonesia, Portugal, the Netherlands 
and Japan) have expressed their 
solidarity and concern for the church 
and people of East Timor . . . 
'The Uniting Church should heed 
this call from the wider ecumenical 
community, and call upon the 
Australian Government to use its 
influence with Indonesia to end the 
abuse of human rights in East Timor, 
allow free access to the Red Cross and 
other aid agencies, and open the 
country to journalists and Government 
representatives who can report on the 
situation in East Timor. 
'At the same time the UCA should 
express its solidarity with the people 
and Churches of East Timor as they 
struggle for peace and justice and 
should pray for the people in their 
suffering.'• 
The Uniting Church and East Timor may be 
acquired from the Social Responsibility & Justice 
Committee, Uniting Church in Australia, Box 
E266, St James Post Office, NSW - 2000, 
Australia. 
REVIEW 
Finngeir Hiorth has reviewed for us an 
article in the Indonesian Quarterly 
(Vol, No.4, 1986, pp.546-77) by Mr 
Kristiadi, a staff member of the official 
Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS), which publishes the 
Quarterly. It deals principally with the 
1974-5 period, and treats events from a 
pro-Indonesian point of view. 
Kristiadi's account, concludes Finngeir 
Hiorth, 'shows mainly how the 
Indonesian government wants the 
world to look at East Timor. It is clearly 
still impossible to publish an objective 
account of the East Timor affair in 
Indonesia.' We summarise the review 
below: 
Much attention is given to Apodeti, 
which is presented as 'essentially the 
legalisation of long standing freedom 
movements in East Timor. Many 
prominent members of that party were 
fighters in the popular rebellion of 
1945-1949 in Los Palos' (p.549). 
In describing Indonesian govern-
ment policy, Kristiadi accepts that on 
October 8 1974 President Suharto 
declared that his government did not 
'have territorial ambitions' and 
respected 'the right of of the people of 
East Timor to self-determination' 
(p.551). Indonesian contacts with 
Portugal, France and the United 
Kingdom are described in some detail. 
Kristiadi accepts that 'in only one 
month' after the end of August 1974, 
Fretilin 'succeeded in controlling 
almost the whole territory of East 
Timor', but he argues that it was 
Fretilin which destabilised th.e border 
area and 'often violated Indonesian 
territory by firing artillery shells into it 
as well as by plundering cattle and 
food.' Indonesia, it is said, played little 
role in the invasion, for which the 
principal credit is given to Apodeti. 
The UN's role is discussed - and 
dismissed as insignificant, because the 
UN did not take account of the 'existing 
objective realities inherent in the 
problem'. 
Finally Hiorth points out that 
Kristiadi's list of sources makes no 
mention of 'Carmel Budiardjo and 
Liem Soei Liong, James Dunn, Jill 
Jolliffe, Torben Retboll . . . Roger 
S. Clark . . or Amnesty Inter-
national.'• 
Timor Link is published at least four 
times a year by the Catholic Institute 
for International Relations, in 
association with A Paz e Possivel em 
Timor Leste in Portugal. 
We invite readers to make a 
subscription towards our costs, of £5.00 
for individuals and £10.00 for 
institutions. All subscriptions run from 
January to December. 
We welcome correspondence. 
22 Coleman Fields 
London Nl 7 AF 
Tel: (01) 354 0883. 
Telex 21118 G. 
THE CHRISTIAN 
REFLECTION: UPDATE 
Since the last issue of Timar Link we 
have received more letters of support 
for the statement East Timar - A 
Christian Reflection which was 
published following the last meeting of 
European Christians in Geneva in 
February of this year. 
Those who have written include: the 
Catholic Commission for 
Evangelisation, Justice and 
Development, Archdiocese of 
Wellington, New Zealand; 
Development & Peace, Ontario, 
Canada; the Dominican Sisters in the 
Solomon Islands; Edouard Vogel in 
Brazil; the Sacred Heart Sisters, 
Eldoret, Kenya; the Jesuit Centre for 
Social Faith and Justice in Toronto, 
Canada; the Good Shepherd 
Provincialate, Abbotford, Victoria, 
Australia; the Mission & Justice 
Education Programme, Tasmania, 
Australia;, the Austrian Committee for 
East Timor, Vienna; the Groupe de 
Travail Timor Oriental in Switzerland; 
Raymond Guillaneuf, Clermont 
Ferrand, France; Hendrik Amahor-
seja, Sweden; Seonag Monk, UK; 
Norman Duff, UK. 
If you are concerned, please let us 
know, wherever you may be 
indicating whether you are able to 
make your support public.• 
Meeting to Discuss ET in 
Asia 
An important meeting to discuss East 
Timor was held in Asia during 
November. It took place in Manila, the 
Philippine capital, between November 
15 and 17. 
The meeting was private and 
involved representatives from South 
East and East Asian countries, the 
nations of the Pacific and Australasia, 
and observers from Europe and the 
United States. 
Its importance will be evident for all 
those concerned by the issue: for a very 
long time, it has been impossible to 
discuss this question openly and 
rationally within Asia, because of the 
extremely vigorous condemnation of 
all attempts at debate by the 
Indonesian government and by the 
majority of Indonesian organisations. 
If successful, it is hoped that this 
meeting will open the way to much 
franker and more open discussion 
about East Timor within Asia, increase 
the effectiveness of work on the issue, 
and multiply practical contacts within 
Asia and the Pacific. 
If you wish to learn more about this 
meeting, please telephone or write to: 
the Asia-Pacific Consultation on East 
Timor, PO Box 1092, North Fitzroy, 
Victoria 3068, Australia. Telephone 
(03) 419 5588. 
European Christian 
Consultation: Lisbon 
The next meeting of European 
Christians on East Timor will be held in 
Lisbon over the weekend of January 23 
and 24. 
It will be the fourth meeting in the 
series, and will follow up the work 
begun in previous meetings held in the 
Netherlands and in Geneva. All have : 
been private in character, designed to 
enable representatives of Europe's 
Catholic and Protestant denominations 
to reflect upon and discuss the question 
of East Tim or. 
Following the Geneva Consultation 
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in February of this year, the sponsors of 
these meetings published a first 
statement of concern, titled East Timar 
- A Christian Reflection which has 
now been translated into several 
languages and has been supported by 
Justice & Peace Commissions and 
Christian groups from a wide range of 
countries inside and outside Europe. 
For further information about the 
next meeting, you are invited to contact 
either A Paz e Possivel em Timor-
Leste, in Lisbon, or CUR at the address 
of Timor Link, in London. 
